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Abstract 
Synthetic Repurchase Programs Through Put Derivatives:  
 
Theory and Evidence 
 
Stanley Bojidarov Gyoshev 
 
George P. Tsetsekos 
 
 
A Synthetic Repurchase is an open market share repurchase program enhanced 
with sales of put derivatives on the firm’s own stock. Microsoft, in 1999, using a 
synthetic repurchase program sold put derivatives on its own stock and received $766 
million in premiums and, at the same time, signaled that it is a good-quality company and 
certified its future earnings.  
I present a theoretical rationale that explains why a synthetic repurchase program 
provides an efficient signal about a firm’s future prospects and how it establishes a 
separating equilibrium between good and bad firms. I also postulate that the signal 
provides quality certification about the firms’ future prospect. 
A sample of all companies that are known to have sold put derivatives was 
collected by searching 10-K and 10-Q statements published between January 1988 and 
January 2000. The sample includes the 53 identified companies that have initiated 
synthetic repurchase programs. 
I find empirical confirmation of the signaling hypothesis for synthetic 
repurchases. Event study results empirically confirm the theoretical hypothesis that the 
initiation of a synthetic repurchase program provides a positive signal to the market. 
Also, the empirical results confirm the theoretical hypothesis that the termination of a 
     
ix
synthetic repurchase program is a negative signal to the market. The market reacts 
positively to the initiation of a synthetic repurchase program, and negatively to its 
termination. I also performed an EPS analyst forecast revisions event study with very 
similar results, which also confirm the signalling hypothesis of asymmetric information. 
Results also show a positive and statistically significant 11.7% book-to-market 
and size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal average annual return. In addition, I find a 
significant improvement in various measures of the financial profiles of the firms in the 
sample subsequent to the put derivative sale. Finally, I observe that these firms have 
higher earnings, R&D expenditures, and cash flows as compared with two industry-and-
size-matched control samples of rival firms with and without repurchase programs 
respectively. Risky R&D expenditures force a firm to initiate a synthetic repurchase 
program in order to signal the market about their expectations of good future EBIT 
figures. 
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I. Introduction 
 Firms have used put derivatives on their own stock as an underlying asset since 
the early 1990s. The practice has generated significant interest in the financial industry 
and is long due for a systematic scientific study.  
Repurchase programs have been a corporate tool for more than a quarter of a 
century. Beginning with Norgaard and Norgaard (1974), more than a hundred studies 
have examined the wealth effect and the influence of different factors on the financial 
performance of firms announcing stock repurchase programs. Stoll (1969) was the first to 
discuss the use of put derivatives.  
Corporations have used synthetic repurchase programs for more than a decade.  In 
February 1991, the SEC1 issued a no-action letter to the CBOE2 that effectively allowed 
firms with listed options to sell out-of-the-money put derivatives. In the same year the 
SEC affirmed the selling of OTC3 puts. According to GAAP4, put premiums are 
considered retained earnings for tax purposes, so put premiums create a tax-free cash 
flow to the firm.  
Kale, Noe and Gay (1989) study the use of puts on a firm’s own stock in 
connection with a repurchase program in the case of Gillette’s anti-takeover defense. 
                                                 
 
 
1 The Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) is a federal agency that regulates the U.S. financial 
markets. The SEC also oversees the securities industry and promotes full disclosure in order to protect the 
investing public against malpractice in the securities markets. 
2 The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) is a securities exchange created in the early 1970s for the 
public trading of standardized option contracts.  
3 Over-the-counter market (OTC) is a decentralized market (as opposed to an exchange market) where 
geographically dispersed dealers are linked by telephones and computer screens. The market is for 
securities not listed on a stock or bond exchange. 
4 Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP) are the overall conventions, rules, and procedures that 
define accepted accounting practice at a particular time in the U.S. 
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They demonstrate the cumulative tax advantages of transferable put rights5 (TPR) to all 
shareholders over the conventional fixed-price tender offer repurchase program. Financial 
practitioners have exhibited a significant interest in the transaction.  
Paul Mazzilli at Morgan Stanley & Co. said that "a large portion of the firms that 
do [share repurchase] programs with me have been introduced to [selling put derivatives], 
and use the strategy.”6  Angel, Gastineau and Weber (1997) estimate that more than 10% 
of all American Stock Exchange firms that have a repurchase program use put derivatives 
in combination with it. 
These instances indicate the practical significance of initiating a synthetic 
repurchase program. So far there has not been a thorough theoretical or empirical 
examination of whether the use of put derivatives enhances a firm’s share repurchase 
program. I investigate synthetic repurchase program using proper financial methodology 
to find out if it enhances or reduces shareholder value and how it influences the financial 
performance of the firms that use it. 
A. Example of the Profitability of the Synthetic Repurchase Programs to 
Good Firms: The Case Study of Microsoft in the 1990s. 
 
Microsoft is one of the largest firms in the world, which realized the highest net 
income in the world in the 1990s. It used a synthetic repurchase program to signal its 
superior quality and to generate cash in the process. As evident from Table 1, the cash 
received in the form of put premiums for the put derivatives sold has amounted from fifty 
                                                 
 
 
5 Transferable put rights occur when a firm issues an option to its shareholders to sell the firm one share of 
its common stock at a fixed price (the strike price) within a stated period (the time to maturity). The put 
right is "transferable" because it can be traded in the capital markets. 
6 Tom Pratt (1994) 
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million dollars to three quarters of a billion dollars per year, representing from three 
percent to twelve percent of Microsoft’s net income for the respective year. This is a huge 
amount, especially considering that the put premiums are not taxable, because they are 
considered part of retained earnings for tax purposes. 
Table 1 – Microsoft’s use of synthetic repurchase 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Net Operating Income 2,038 3,078 5,130 6,414 9,928 10,937
Income from Investments
(Interest Income) 191 320 443 703 1,803 3,182
Miscellaneous Expenses
(Gain on sales) (62) (19) (259) $- 160 156
Provision for Income Taxes (714) (1,184) (1,860) (2,627) (4,106) (4,854)
Net Income $1,453 $2,195 $3,454 $4,490 $7,785 $9,421
Yearly Return 51.10% 57.40% 30.00% 73.40% 21.00%
Common Stock Repurchased (698) (1,385) (3,101) (2,468) (2,950) (4,896)
Put Premiums Received as a
Percentage of Common Stock
Repurchased 7.02% 8.95% 3.06% 21.80% 25.97% 9.64%
Common Stock Repurchased
as a Percentage of Net
Income 48.04% 63.10% 89.78% 54.97% 37.89% 51.97%
Put Premiums Received $49 $124 $95 $538 $766 $472
Put Premiums as % of "Net
Income" 3.37% 5.65% 2.75% 11.98% 9.84% 5.01%
* All Dollar Values are in Millions 
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B. Why Put Derivatives Enhance Share Repurchase Programs: A 
Numerical Example of Put Derivatives Payoffs to the Firm and to the 
Shareholders 
A synthetic repurchase program can be compared to a warranty on a product. If a 
firm has a good product, it is not a financial burden for the firm to attach a warranty (put 
derivative) to the product (the underlying stock). However, a warranty allows customers 
to separate good products from bad products. Similarly, the put derivative helps inventors 
to separate good firms from bad firms. Grossman (1981) shows that it is cheaper for a 
firm with good-quality products to provide a product warranty than a firm with bad-
quality products.  Offering a warranty allows a firm to signal the good-quality of its 
products. In the same way, a firm can signal its overall (stock) quality. In this case, the 
firm’s stock is the product, and the put option is the warranty that the stock price will not 
fall below the strike price. 
Consider a numerical example of the payoff profile to the firm and to the 
shareholder. I first examine the payoff structure of the short put position and its 
implications on the future cash flows of the issuing firm. (Please see example in Figure. 
1.) There is a small positive cash inflow equal to the already collected premium, if the 
option expires out of the money. But there is a very large negative cash outflow if the 
stock price is below the strike price, equal to the difference between the two prices times 
the number of shares in the contract.  
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Figure 1: A numerical example of a payoff structure of short put position with 
exercise price at $50 and premium valued at $2 
 
 
This is a very efficient signal, which is very costly to mimic for bad firms. The 
signal allows a separating equilibrium between good firms whose management can 
guarantee a positive change in the stock price in the future and bad firms whose 
management cannot guarantee positive future stock price returns.  
Shareholders by definition hold a long stock position. Also, the firm is creating 
for shareholders a long position in the put derivatives whose underlying asset is the firm’s 
stock. Thus the position of the average shareholder becomes a long call derivative 
position, shown in Figure 2. This is equivalent to the firm guaranteeing to the 
shareholders that the price of the stock will be above the option strike price. 
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Figure 2: A numerical example of a payoff structure of the combination of long 
stock position and long put position with exercise price at $50 and premium 
valued at $2 
  
C. Separation into Good- and Bad-Quality Firms 
I can break down firms into four groups, according to their use of put derivatives 
and their need of external financing: firms that make use of put options, with and without 
excess cash, and firms that don’t make use of put derivatives, with and without excess 
cash. 
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Table 2: The big picture: breakdown of firms according to availability of excess 
cash and use of put derivatives 
Firms that … Have Excess Cash (as evident from repurchase program) 
Need External Financing (as 
evident from Seasonal Offering)
Sale Put 
Derivatives 
Initiate a synthetic repurchase 
program through put options 
Issue debt or SEO7 in 
combination with put warrants 
Do Not Sale Put 
Derivatives 
Initiate a “plain vanilla” open market 
repurchase program Issue straight debt or SEO 
 
 
I would expect that firms that sell put derivatives on their own stock are good-
quality firms with new positive net present value projects available to them, and firms 
that do not sell put derivatives to be bad-quality firms. 
 In particular, if firm issuing straight debt or seasonal equity, I would expect it to 
be a poor-quality firm in need of external financing. If a firm issues debt or seasonal 
equity and attaches put warrants to the issue, I would expect it to be a good-quality firm, 
that needs external financing for new positive net present value projects. If a firm 
engages in a traditional stock repurchase, I would expect it to be a poor-quality firm with 
financial slack. Finally, if the firm undertakes a synthetic repurchase program through the 
issue of put options, I would expect that it is a good-quality firm that has financial slack. 
For firms that need external financing, the above is argued by Gibson and Singh 
(2000) who propose a theoretical model, in which corporations that need to raise new 
capital can use put options to signal their quality and reduce their financing costs by 
                                                 
 
7 Seasonal Equity Offering 
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attracting a better price for their newly offered securities. However, their model is not 
applicable to firms that repurchase stock because they are not in need of new capital.  
This dissertation examines the case of firms with excess cash, as evidence by the 
initiation of a repurchase program. 
Table 3: My hypotheses about firms with excess cash (as evident from a 
repurchase program) 
Synthetic Repurchase Program Through Put 
Options 
? 
==>
 
A Good-quality Firm (with new 
positive NPV projects) 
Repurchase Program ? ==> A Bad-quality Firm 
 
 
I examine the financial performance of firms using synthetic repurchase 
programs. I both examine their abnormal long-run risk-adjusted stock performance and 
compare the financial profiles of firms with synthetic repurchase programs, regular 
repurchase programs, and without repurchase programs. I investigate the potential 
enhancement in shareholder value and the information efficiency resulting from 
combining issue of put derivatives with repurchase programs. 
I separate my sample into two groups depending on the inside information of 
managers about future prospects of the firm: good firms with better-than-expected new 
net present value projects, and bad firms with poorer-than-expected future net present 
value projects. Selling under-priced puts is a costly but not wasteful activity for good 
firms that signals the positive prospects of the firm and enables good firms to create a 
separating equilibrium. 
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 I show theoretically that a good firm can use the inverse relation8 between the put 
payoff and the underlying firm stock very efficiently to signal and certify its quality, and 
I present empirical evidence to confirm the theoretical models. Put derivatives issued by a 
good firm at a fair price according to the publicly available information will be 
overpriced, and put derivatives issued by bad firms at a fair price according to the 
publicly available information will be under priced. The difference in the “fair” intrinsic 
value, based on insider information, establishes a separating equilibrium between the 
good and the bad firms. Therefore, good firms initiate a synthetic repurchase program, 
and bad firms choose not to send a false signal. 
The principal new feature of this signaling technique is that it transmits the signal 
without wasteful spending activity like dividend increases, discussed by John and 
Williams (1985), or inefficient investments and the passing up of positive NPV projects, 
discussed by Krasker (1986). 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) examine the issuance of rights to existing shareholders 
and find that there are high transaction costs of rights and exacerbation of the agency 
problem because the payoff structure of rights is equivalent to decreasing the dividend 
payments. Put derivatives solve the agency problem. When a firm underperforms, cash 
has to be given to the put holders, i.e., taken away from managers.  Also, put transactions 
entail no transaction cost outflow; on the contrary, there is a tax-free gain from the put 
premiums collected. 
                                                 
 
 
8 Nachman and Noe (1994) show that if there is not a inverse relation between the securities issued, i.e., a 
firm is limited to issuing securities with non-decreasing payoffs, then there cannot not be a separating 
equilibrium between good and bad firms.  That is, a firm can always mimic the security issuing behavior of 
a good firm without negative impact on the bad firm shareholders value. 
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Put options allow us to separate good firms from bad firms, because a put-issuing 
firm commits to pay more cash in bad states of the world, which is more likely for a 
poorer quality firm. As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, good firms will retain all the 
value for their existing shareholders, and bad firms will be punished by giving up some of 
their value to the put holders. 
The sale of put derivatives allows investors to differentiate firms that announce 
stock repurchase programs:  those that guarantee the delivery of their stock repurchase 
program through put options and those that initiate a stock repurchase program as a free 
call option available to the firm management. Put options thus alleviate the asymmetric 
information problem and increase the positive information effect of the stock repurchase 
program. 
D. Stochastic Dominance Distribution of Good and Bad Firms Allowing 
Separating Equilibrium Through Put Derivatives 
 
When a put option is written, there is an asymmetry of information between the 
management of the firm and the investors.  I can assume without loss of generality that 
all firms will be offered the same put premium, because before the synthetic repurchase 
program initiation only the management knows whether their firm is financially strong or 
financially weak. Investors will assume that all firms have the same probability 
distribution of stock prices at put expiration. I can also assume without loss of generality 
that at the moment the put option is written there are three stochastically dominant 
distributions that will represent the probability function of the stock price put option 
expiration; the distribution of good firms, the distribution of bad firms, and the average 
distribution, which will be the expected distribution of stock price at put expiration from 
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the uninformed investors’ perspective. The normal distribution is a subset of the 
stochastic dominance distributions. And without loss of generality I can assume for this 
example that the three distributions of the stock price at put expiration are normal 
distributions with different means and the same standard deviation. Please see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Expected distribution of good and bad firms at put expiration 
 
 
The difference between an exchange-traded put option and a put option written by 
a firm is the default risk of the underlying firm. In the case of an exchange-traded put 
option, when the stock price of the firm is going down, the put option becomes deeper 
into the money, and the exchange guarantees payment, i.e., provides “insurance” in case 
of default of the firm. When put option is written by a firm, there is a default risk. If the 
stock price of the firm drops, there is some point at which the total value of the firm is the 
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put holder as a settlement payment. Below this point, the firm will default, and the put 
holders will not be properly compensated, unlike the exchange-traded put holders. 
Now, let me look at this from the perspective of the stockholders.  Here I have the 
reverse picture.  There is a point under which the stockholders are not going to receive 
any money, and the firm will go bankrupt. When the stock price is between this point and 
the put option exercise price, some of the value of the firm will go to the stockholders and 
some to the putholders. Finally, when the stock price is above the put option strike price, 
the shareholders will keep the entire value of the firm for themselves. Please see Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Stakeholder value at put expiration 
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To be able to assess the signaling effect of issue of a put option by a financially 
weak or financially strong firm, I have to integrate the stockholder value at put expiration 
with and without the put option sold in the case of the three stochastic dominance 
distributions:  for good firms, for bad firms, and for average firms from the uninformed 
investor perspective. The difference between the integrals of stockholder value at put 
expiration with and without the put option sold will give me the expected firm value at 
put expiration for good, average, and bad firms that have chosen to sell put options 
compared to those that have not chosen to do so. 
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Figure 5: Expected firm value at put expiration 
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As can be seen from Figure 5, there is almost no difference between the value of 
good firm, that has sold put options and a good firm, that has not sold a put option. 
Furthermore, the option premium is much greater than the difference between the 
expected firm value at put expiration. 
For the average firm, i.e., for any firm from an uninformed investor perspective, 
the difference between the expected value of average firm is equal to the put premium 
paid.  That is, the put premium exactly compensates the average firms for participation in 
the synthetic repurchase programs. There is an additional benefit for the firm, because 
taxes due are figured in the calculation of the put valuation, but the put premium is, in 
fact, tax-free.  
There is a huge difference between the expected value of a bad firm that has sold 
put options to falsely certify its quality and a bad firm that has chosen not to mimic the 
certifying behavior of good firms. The put premium received is much smaller and could 
not compensate the firm for the risk involved. 
 This creates a separating equilibrium between good and bad firms. Good firms are 
rewarded for selling put options and certifying their quality, while good firms will choose 
not to participate, because of huge expected financial penalties for them. 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Derivatives Usage by Firms 
 
The remarkable spread in the use of derivatives, combined with celebrated large 
losses associated with their use, has made derivatives usage of considerable interest. 
Howton and Perfect (1998) find that 61% of Fortune 500/S&P 500 firms and 36% of 
randomly selected firms use derivatives. Derivatives can be used to hedge or to speculate. 
Hedging is an attempt to lessen or avoid unexpected revenue loss or gain from activities 
not related to the core firm operations through counterbalancing investments. Hedging is 
usually accomplished by acquisition of financial derivatives or real assets that reduce the 
variance of the firm cash flows or earnings.9   
Speculation is the divesture of financial derivatives or real assets that increase the 
variability of the firm cash flows or earnings.10. Synthetic repurchase is a good example 
of speculation. It magnifies firm financial performance, whatever it may be. 
When the firm experiences good financial performance, it reaps an additional 
positive cash flow in the form of keeping the option premiums collected. When the firm 
experiences weak financial performance, there is an additional negative cash flow to the 
firm in the form of the difference between the current firm market price and the option 
strike price. The use of derivatives thus becomes an efficient signal to the market about 
firm quality.  
                                                 
 
 
9 Could be firm merger or acquisition. 
10 Could be divesture of plant or subsidiary. 
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Theoretically, hedging will increase firm value by reducing expected taxes, 
expected costs of financial distress and other agency costs. Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996) find that derivatives use is positively related to the value of a firm's growth 
options, only when the derivatives fair value as the measure of hedging activity is used. 
Guay (1999) finds a statistically significant decrease in firm risk exposure, measured by 
interest rate and exchange rate exposures, following the initiation of derivatives usage.  
These findings lead me to conclude that firms use derivatives mainly to hedge. 
Synthetic repurchase is more of a speculative action, and warrants further investigation of 
the motives and rationale for the transaction. 
Larger firms have more sophisticated financial management practices and are thus 
more likely to use derivatives. There are economies of scale in the structure of transaction 
costs of derivatives. As the derivatives contract size increases, the transaction fee 
decreases as a percentage of the contract.  Howton and Perfect (1998) find that 61% of 
Fortune 500/S&P 500 firms and 36% of randomly selected firms use derivatives. Nance, 
Smith, and Smithson (1993) show that firms using hedging instruments face more convex 
tax functions and have higher dividend yields. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find that 
derivatives use increases with certain parameters. They also find that the corporate use of 
derivatives decreases with interest coverage and liquidity. Barton (2000) finds that firms 
with larger derivatives portfolios have lower levels of discretionary accruals.  
Overall derivative use has been found to increase with firm size, leverage, 
percentage of international income, the presence of tax losses, the proportion of shares 
held by directors, and the payout ratio. Next, I will describe the theoretical motives for 
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using derivatives and how they could be related to share repurchase program. All 
hypotheses are summarized in Table 4. 
1. Size Advantage Hypothesis 
Size of a firm is related to more sophisticated financial management practices, 
and a sophisticated firm is more likely to use derivatives. Derivatives transactions 
experience economies of scale effects as well. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find that 
derivative use increases with size. Howton and Perfect (1998) find that 61% of Fortune 
500/S&P 500 firms but only 36% of randomly selected firms use derivatives. 
2. Firm's Growth Options Hypothesis 
Firms with promising growth options use derivatives to hedge risk that is not 
related to the core business. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find that derivative use is 
positively related to the value of a firm's growth options, only when derivatives fair value 
is used as the measure of hedging activity. Guay (1998) confirms this result using book 
value of assets scaled by market value of liabilities as a proxy. 
3. Agency Problem Between Shareholders and Bondholders Hypothesis 
Hedging with derivatives can be used to resolve agency problems, i.e., to resolve 
the conflicts of interest between equity holders and senior claim holders. Smith and Stulz 
(1985) show theoretically that hedging redistributes income from shareholders to 
bondholders, which has the effect of substituting riskier assets for safer ones thereby 
decreasing the probability of bankruptcy. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) find that 
managers use derivatives to substitute for discretionary accruals in order to smooth 
earnings so as to reduce agency costs. Speculating by selling put options is thus 
advantageous for shareholders.  
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4. Agency Problem Between Shareholders and Management Hypothesis 
(Managerial Risk Aversion Hypothesis)  
Solving the management risk aversion problem would allow shareholders 
effectively to reduce management, employees and suppliers (claim holders) 
compensation. Risk-averse agents who contract with the firm in these ways cannot fully 
diversify their claims. Smith and Stulz (1985) theoretically prove that firm risk 
management policies depend on managerial incentive schemes.  They also show that if 
the reduction of the risk related to claimholders, and correspondingly their compensation 
is less than the cost of the hedge, it is advantageous to hedge. 
They prove that if the manager’s wealth is a concave function of the firm value, it 
is optimal to hedge the firm completely, assuming that the firm has a competitive 
advantage in hedging over the manager. If the manager’s compensation plan includes 
options or bonuses, however, this makes manager wealth a convex function of the firm 
value and causes the manager to be more risk-seeking. In this case, it will be 
advantageous for the manager to reverse-hedge, for example to sell put options on the 
firm’s own stock. In reality manager compensation schemes make the manager’s wealth 
function convex in some variables and concave in others, so I see a mix of hedging 
strategies. 
5. Firms' Risk Reduction Hypothesis 
The more derivatives a firm uses to hedge, the less risk exposure it has. Guay 
(1998) finds a statistically significant decrease in firm risk exposure, measured by interest 
rate and exchange rate exposures, following the initiation of derivatives usage. 
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6. External Financing Hypothesis:  
Firms use derivatives to smooth earnings and to reduce the cost of external 
financing. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find that short-term asset growth, the 
proportion of foreign assets to total assets, and the use of alternative capital instruments 
are not related to derivatives use. Howton (1998) finds that currency derivatives usage is 
related to expected external financing costs, but interest rate derivatives usage is 
unrelated to expected external financing costs. 
Adam (1999) finds that hedging practices are more highly correlated with firms' 
capital expenditures than with operating expenditures or sales. He also shows that firms 
that use derivatives depend less on external capital sources to finance their capital 
expenditures, but the degree to which firms hedge their future capital expenditures is 
negatively related to their current financial condition and their ability to access external 
capital markets. He concludes that financial constraints are an important factor in 
determining what to hedge and to what extend.  
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) find that firm risk management policies 
depend on the cost of external financing. They also demonstrate the need to coordinate 
investing and financing policies.  
7. Tax Reduction Hypothesis 
When effective corporate tax rates are progressive, derivatives are used to smooth 
out earnings and to decrease the effective tax rate (in the case of small firms) Smith and 
Stulz (1985) prove theoretically that smaller firms are more likely to have tax advantages 
than larger firms, and that firm risk management policies depend on progressive tax rates. 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) show that firms using hedging instruments face more 
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convex tax functions.  Howton (1998) finds that currency derivative usage is related to 
tax considerations.  
8.  Leverage Hypothesis 
To hedge interest rate risk exposure, firms with high leverage use more 
derivatives than firms with low leverage. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find a positive 
relationship between the debt-to-equity ratio and the level of derivatives usage. 
9. Payout Ratio Hypothesis 
The more income a firm is distributing as dividends, the less risk it can assume; 
hence it hedges more. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) show that firms using hedging 
instruments have higher dividend yields. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) find a positive 
relationship between the payout ratio and the level of derivatives usage.  
10. Financial Distress Hypothesis 
The main reason firms cite for the use of derivatives is to reduce the cost of 
financial distress. Smith and Stulz (1985) prove theoretically that the benefits of hedging 
are greater if a firm faces higher costs of financial distress. They and Nance, Smith, and 
Smithson (1993) confirm that smaller firms are more likely to hedge than larger firms, 
because the direct costs of financial distress are less-than-proportional to firm size. 
Indirect costs of financial distress are likely to be much higher than the direct costs 
associated with bankruptcy. Firm size is not a good proxy for the costs of financial 
distress, because there is no scale effect for the indirect costs of bankruptcy.  
Guay (1998) uses book value of liabilities scaled by the market value of equity 
and operating income volatility as proxies for the probability of financial distress. 
Howton (1998) finds that interest rate derivatives usage is related to expected financial 
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distress costs. He also finds that currency derivatives usage is unrelated to expected 
financial distress costs. 
Put selling may signal to the market that managers believe that there will not be 
financial distress.  
11. Information Signaling by Selling the Put Derivative 
Hedging serves to mitigate information asymmetry, and therefore it can be used to 
reduce earnings variation. Selling a put option is a speculation, so managers are signaling 
that they are very sure about the future prospects of the firm. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that some firms hedge to comply with bond 
covenants. Speculating by selling put options on a firm’s own stock is a very strong 
signal. It communicates management faith in excellent financial future performance. 
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Table 4: Hypotheses about reasons for derivatives usage 
 Descriptions References Predictions and Findings  
  
 
Hypothesis 
  Theoretical Predictions Empirical Findings
1 Size Effect: 
Economies of 
Scale 
Larger firms have more sophisticated 
financial management practices and 
therefore are more likely to use 
derivatives. Also, there are 
transaction costs economies of scale 
in the use of derivatives. 
Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996), Howton and 
Perfect (1998) 
I would expect that firms using put 
derivatives in a stock repurchase 
program would be the largest firms in 
the industry as measured by market 
value for all firms with the same 4-
digit SIC codes. 
 
My sample consists of 
the largest firms in 
their industries. 
2 Firm's Growth 
Options 
Firms with promising growth options 
use derivatives to hedge risk that is 
not related to the core business. 
Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996), Guay (1998) 
Firms using derivatives are expected 
to exhibit better future financial 
performance than firms that do not 
use derivatives.  
 
Higher earnings 
subsequent to the 
event. 
3 Agency problem 
between equity 
holders and 
senior claim 
holders 
Hedging redistributes income from 
shareholders to bondholders, which 
has the effect of substituting more 
risky asset for less risky one, thus 
decreasing the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) 
Selling put options is a speculative 
action. I would expect a decrease in 
the firm’s bond prices and an 
increase in stock prices. 
N/A 
4 Agency problem 
between equity 
holders and 
management 
(Managerial Risk 
Aversion) 
Manager risk aversion depends on 
compensation schemes and on their 
capacity to effectively diversify firm 
risk on a personal level. Insiders 
want to hedge risk, because they 
have un diversifiable risk in the firm. 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Howton (1998) 
Joint hypothesis of both 
compensation scheme and hedging. 
Not testable. Proportion of shares 
held by directors should be more than 
at non-hedging firms. 
N/A 
5 Derivatives Use 
Decrease Risk 
Exposure 
Firm risk exposure is proportionally 
reduced with the level of derivatives 
it uses to hedge.  
Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996), Guay (1998) 
The use of derivatives creates less 
variation in the future earnings. 
More variation in 
future earnings is 
observed. 
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 Descriptions References Predictions and Findings  
  
 
Hypothesis 
  Theoretical Predictions Empirical Findings
6 External 
Financing 
Firms use derivatives to smooth 
earnings and to reduce the cost of 
external financing. 
Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993), Howton 
(1998), Adam (1999) 
The use of derivatives creates less 
variation in future earnings and 
facilitates future external financing.  
More variation in 
future earnings. Not 
significantly different 
levels of future 
external financing. 
 
7 Tax Reduction Firms use derivatives to smooth 
earnings and reduce the tax burden. 
Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Nance, Smith, and 
Smithson (1993), Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein 
(1993), Howton (1998) 
The use of derivatives creates less 
variation in future earnings. Also, I 
would expect to find less tax paid 
subsequent to the sale of put options 
or current tax losses to be carried 
forward. 
 
More variation in the 
future earnings. More 
tax paid subsequent 
to the event. 
8 Leverage Highly leveraged firms use more 
derivatives to hedge interest rate 
exposure than less leveraged firms. 
 
Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996) 
Increase in the leverage ratio several 
years prior to the put option initiation. 
No increase in the 
leverage ratio. 
9 Payout Ratio High dividend paying firms maintain 
low disposable income, thus the 
need to hedge is more. 
 
Berkman and Bradbury 
(1996), Nance, Smith, 
and Smithson (1993) 
Higher payout ratio than rival firms. The payout ratio is 
not higher than that of 
the rival firms. 
10 Financial 
Distress 
By hedging different risk via 
derivatives the firm is reducing the 
cost of financial distress. 
Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Nance et al. (1993), 
Howton (1998), Guay 
(1998) 
 
I would expect reduction in future 
operating income volatility and also 
reduction in future book value of 
liabilities scaled by MV of equity. 
More variation in the 
future operating 
income.  
11 Information 
Signaling  
Hedging can be used to reduce 
earnings variation and hence to 
mitigate information asymmetry. Put 
option is speculation, so 
management is signaling that it is 
very sure about the future prospects 
of the firm. 
Froot, Scharfstein and 
Stein (1993) 
Increase in future earnings and 
positive abnormal book-to-market and 
size adjusted long-run stock price 
over performance. 
Higher future 
earnings than rival 
firms. And 11.7% over 
performance. 
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B. Stock Repurchase Programs 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) state that in 1998 for the first time in history, US 
firms distributed more cash to shareholders through share buyback programs than 
through dividends. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that on average firms repurchase 
almost 80% percent of shares authorized for repurchase within three years of initiation of 
a repurchase program.  
Dittmar (2000) finds that there are repurchase waves when a motivation for 
repurchasing changes over time. At all times firms repurchase shares to take advantage of 
undervaluation of their stock.   She finds that the second reason is distribution of excess 
capital. But she also finds evidence that valid reasons at times are takeover defense, 
achievement of leverage ratio and keeping the share base constant while distributing 
shares as employee compensation.  
I summarize eight hypotheses in the finance literature for motives for repurchase 
in Table 5. 
 
1. Lack of Investments Hypothesis 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find that the average firm shrinks its asset base 
subsequent to stock repurchase tender offers. Grullon (2000) finds that market reaction to 
share repurchase announcements is negatively correlated with the firm’s operating return 
on investments. He also finds that repurchasing firms reduce their capital expenditures 
subsequent to a repurchase announcement.  
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) claim that share repurchases are a “voluntary 
transfer of capital from the old to the new economy.”  They claim that stockholders can 
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allocate funds more effectively than corporate managers because the shareholders have a 
broader view of the economy-wide opportunities.  
If this were the correct hypothesis for the rational behind synthetic repurchase 
programs, I would expect to observe a decrease in the number of new projects undertaken 
by the firm and consequently a reduction in R&D expenditures, as a proxy for new 
projects, around the initiation of the repurchase program. 
 
2. Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Jensen (1986) was the first to hypothesize that there is an agency cost of free cash 
flows.  Shareholders expect that managers will destroy value by undertaking investments 
that fail to earn the required cost of capital. Jensen (1986) states that firms repurchase 
stock to distribute unnecessary cash flows. Brennan and Thakor (1990) find that firms 
with a high level of excess cash repurchase stock. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find 
that the amount of shares repurchased is positively correlated to the levels of free cash 
flow, which also confirms the liquidity hypothesis. 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) find that operating performance following repurchases 
improves only in low-growth firms, and that these gains are generated by more efficient 
use of assets, as well as asset sales, rather than improved growth opportunities. This 
allows them to conclude that repurchases are not used to signal better prospects, or to 
change the capital structure of the firm rather to eliminate the agency problem of free 
cash flows.  
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If this is the correct hypothesis for the use of synthetic repurchase programs, I 
would expect to observe free cash prior to and no cash subsequent to the initiation of 
synthetic repurchase. 
 
3. Undervaluation Hypothesis 
The undervaluation hypothesis states that insiders believe a firm’s stock is 
undervalued. The reason management repurchases shares is to acquire mispriced shares at 
a bargain price. Vermaelen (1981) finds that firms repurchasing common stock signal 
undervaluation. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that the amount of shares 
repurchased is negatively correlated with previous share price performance, confirming 
that firms with greater perceived undervaluation repurchase more.  
Porter, Roenfeldt and Sicherman (2000) show that shareholders capture value 
upon the repurchase of the discounted shares. They find that firms selling at a discount 
have much a more positive market reaction to the announcement than firms that sell at a 
premium to net asset value. The difference for the two groups is statistically significant. 
I would expect a run-up in stock prices after the initiation of a synthetic 
repurchase program. 
 
4. Information Signaling Hypothesis 
Miller and Rock (1985) introduce the informational signaling hypothesis. It 
implies that undervaluation can be corrected by reducing the information asymmetry 
between managers and market participants with the help of a costly signal. The signal is 
credible if it imposes constraints on management flexibility. Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
introduce the traditional view that share repurchases transmit management expectations 
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of future earnings and cash flows. Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that pre-
announcement returns are negatively correlated with the market response to the 
repurchase announcement.  
Grullon (2000) finds on one hand a significant decline in operating income as a 
percentage of total assets, and on the other hand a downgrade in analyst forecast revisions 
subsequent to a repurchase announcement. This contradicts the hypothesis that 
management is signaling good news about future earnings or cash flows of the firm. 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) also provide the plausible explanation that managers are 
not transmitting new information to the market, but rather are showing their disagreement 
with the way the market is pricing firm performance.  
Brockman and Chung (2000) decompose bid-ask spreads, and show that adverse 
selection costs increase substantially when market participants respond to the presence of 
informed managerial trading. Porter, Roenfeldt and Sicherman (2000) develop a measure 
of signaling. Ratner, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1996) show that the information content 
of stock repurchases changes with the percentage change in the institutional ownership of 
the firm. The theory for information signaling would lead me to expect a positive stock 
price reaction and better financial performance in the future. 
 
5. Capital Structure Adjustments Hypothesis 
The capital structure adjustments hypothesis, or the leverage policy hypothesis, 
state that firms repurchase stock to increase their financial leverage, i.e., to transfer 
wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) claim that firms 
repurchase stock to increase their financial leverage. Hovakimian (2000) finds that equity 
repurchases result in changes in the leverage ratio, either economically trivial or 
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transitory and he concludes that target leverage considerations play a minor role in equity 
repurchase decisions. If this hypothesis is correct, I would expect an increase in the debt-
to-equity ratio. 
6. Executive Incentive Hypothesis 
The executive incentive hypothesis, otherwise known as the management and 
employee compensation policy, states that a firm engages in share repurchase programs 
in order to acquire the stock necessary for satisfying employee compensation plans 
without being forced to enlarge the share base of their firm. Chan, Ikenberry and Lee 
(2000) find that repurchase announcements occur around the time of exercise of 
executive stock options. This can be explained by the fact that executive stock options are 
not dividend-protected.  
There is no theoretical rationale that supports the idea that selling put options 
would be a more efficient way of obtaining shares for employee compensation schemes. 
It could be tested whether put protection can enhance the value of managers’ personal 
call options that are part of the compensation scheme.  
The executive incentive hypothesis predicts that the number of shares outstanding 
will not increase over time. As a counter-example, Microsoft has an ongoing active 
repurchase program and is using put derivatives with it, but its share base is increasing 
due to its aggressive stock options employee compensation policy. 
7. Management Entrenchment Hypothesis 
The corporate anti-takeover defense or management entrenchment hypothesis 
states that share repurchase reduces free cash flows and increases the share price, and 
repurchase can be used as an anti-takeover defense device. Kale, Noe and Gay (1989) 
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show theoretically that put derivatives are very useful instruments in a share repurchase 
program. Denis (1990) finds that announcement of defensive repurchases is associated 
with a significant decline in the market value of the target firm. Bagwell (1991) shows 
how share repurchase can be used as an anti-takeover defense device.  
The anti-takeover defense (management entrenchment) hypothesis is not testable 
with my dataset. 
8. Dividend Substitution Hypothesis 
The dividends substitution hypothesis states that firms substitute for dividend 
payback more cost-efficient repurchase distributions. Unlike missing a dividend, there is 
no penalty if a firm does not repurchase on a regular basis. Some firms announce a stock 
repurchase program, but do not repurchase. Also, investors are able to postpone 
realization of capital gains tax. Further, capital gains are taxed at lower rates than 
dividends. Dividends are taxed as ordinary income; repurchases are taxed as capital 
gains.  
Protopapadakis (1983) estimates that the net present value of the capital gains tax 
liability is approximately 7% of the realized gain. Dittmar (2000) states that a firm 
starting an open market repurchase program does not have a commitment to repurchase. 
This is why repurchases are a preferred form of distribution of free cash flows.  
The theoretical prediction of the dividend substitution hypothesis would be a 
permanent increase in free cash and no increase in the dividend payout ratio. 
9. Other Options 
There are two more reasons for stock repurchase programs mentioned in the 
literature, but they are not relevant to my research. One is odd-lot repurchase, which a 
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firm undertakes to reduce its servicing costs. The other special case of stock repurchases 
is open market stock repurchases in response to a stock market crash. Comment and 
Jarrell (1991) find that immediately after market downturns management motives for 
stock buyback programs can be different from at all other times. Also, the SEC lifts some 
trading rules after stock market crashes. 
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Table 5: Hypotheses of the reasons for repurchase 
# Descriptions References Predictions and Findings 
 
 
Hypotheses for 
the reasons for 
repurchase   Theoretical 
Predictions 
My Empirical 
Findings 
1 Lack of 
Investment 
Opportunities 
 
Firms with no positive NPV projects repurchase 
their stock. 
Nohel and Tarhan (1998), Grullon 
(2000), Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000) 
Decrease in R&D as 
proxy for decrease in 
investments. 
Increase in R&D 
expenditures. 
2 Agency Cost of 
Free Cash Flow 
Available free cash flows create opportunities for 
managers to invest in negative NPV projects. 
Shareholders expect that if there are unexpected 
free cash inflows management will destroy value 
by undertaking investments that fail to earn the 
required cost of capital. 
 
Jensen (1986), Brennan and 
Thakor (1990), Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) 
Free cash prior to and 
no cash flow 
subsequent to the 
repurchase. 
Increase in cash 
flows. 
3 Undervaluation  Insiders believe that the stock is undervalued. 
They repurchase shares to acquire mispriced 
shares at a bargain price. 
 
Vermaelen (1981), Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), Porter, 
Roenfeldt and Sicherman (2000) 
Run-up in stock price 
subsequent to the 
repurchase. 
11.7% positive 
one-year buy-
and-hold excess 
return. 
4 Informational 
Signaling  
Signaling theory implies that undervaluation can 
be corrected with a stock repurchase. The signal 
is credible if it imposes constraints on 
management flexibility.   With a repurchase 
managers show their disagreement with the way 
the market is pricing firm performance 
Miller and Rock (1985), Asquith 
and Mullins (1986), Dann, Masulis 
and Mayers (1991), Ratner, 
Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1996), 
Comment and Jarrell (1991), 
Grullon (2000), Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000), Brockman and 
Chung (2000), Porter, Roenfeldt 
and Sicherman (2000) 
 
Better financial 
performance in the 
future. 
Higher earnings 
subsequent to 
the event. 
5 Leverage Firms repurchase stock to increase their financial 
leverage, i.e., to transfer wealth from bondholders 
to shareholders. 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989), 
Hovakimian (2000) 
Increase in debt-to-
equity ratio following 
the event. 
 
No change in 
debt-to equity 
ratio. 
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# Descriptions References Predictions and Findings 
 
 
Hypotheses for 
the reasons for 
repurchase   Theoretical 
Predictions 
My Empirical 
Findings 
6 Employee 
Compensation  
Firms engage in share repurchase programs in 
order to acquire the stock necessary for satisfying 
employee compensation plans without being 
forced to enlarge the share base of their firm. 
 
Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2000) Number of shares 
outstanding does not 
increasing over time. 11
No change in 
number of 
shares 
outstanding. 
7 Anti-takeover 
Defense 
Share repurchase reduces the free cash flows and 
increases the share price. Both make it more 
difficult for raiders to acquire the firm. 
 
Kale, Noe and Gay (1989), 
Bagwell (1991), Dennis (1990) 
Not testable with this 
dataset. 
 
8 Dividend 
Substitution  
Unlike dividends, there is no penalty or firm 
commitment to repurchase shares on a regular 
basis. Also, investors are able to postpone the 
realization of capital gains tax, which is payable at 
a lower rate than the dividend tax rate.12  
Protopapadakis (1983), Dittmar 
(2000) 
Permanent Increase in 
free cash and no 
increase in the 
dividends. 
Increase in free 
cash and 
equivalents.    
No change in 
dividend 
distribution. 
                                                 
 
 
11 There is no theoretical rationale that supports the idea that selling put options would be a more efficient way of obtaining shares for employee compensation 
schemes. It could be tested further if the put protection can enhance the value of the managers’ personal call options, which are part of their compensation 
scheme. 
12 Dividends are taxed as ordinary income. Repurchases are taxed as capital gains. 
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C. Synthetic Repurchase 
1. Financial Flexibility of Firm Management Hypothesis 
Of special interest to me is the financial flexibility of firm management 
hypothesis introduced by Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996), combined with the signaling 
hypothesis. By selling a put contract, firm management gives up the financial flexibility 
of an open market share repurchase program. Taking this action represents a costly signal 
of the bright future prospects of the firm. Ikenberry and Vermaelen state that by allowing 
management to buy back shares of the firm when shares are trading at less than their 
underlying value, a board of directors is effectively creating a call option similar to the 
exchange-traded option on the firm stock.  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that management uses this flexibility, and 
repurchases about 80% of the shares authorized for repurchase. Furthermore, Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) find that from 1995 through 1999 80% of S&P 100 firms had 
announced a repurchase program. And management stops buying shares when the share 
price increases and the perceived undervaluation is reduced.  
The exchange option value is determined mainly by the volatility of the stock and 
the number of shares authorized for repurchase. 
 
2. Signaling Hypothesis 
Hedging serves to mitigate information asymmetry, and therefore it can be used to 
reduce earnings variation. Smith and Stulz (1985) show that some firms hedge to comply 
with bond covenants. Selling a put option, on the other hand, is a speculation and 
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increases risk. Therefore engaging in synthetic repurchase certifies that managers are 
very certain about the firm’s positive future prospects and thus it is a very strong signal. 
Synthetic repurchase is also a very efficient signal. Synthetic repurchase is good 
for good firms, because they would collect put premiums free of tax, and the put options 
expire worthless. Synthetic repurchase is very expensive for bad firms, because there is a 
huge financial penalty for false signaling. If the option expires in the money, the firm 
would lose the difference between the strike price and the current stock price times the 
number of put contracts sold. 
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) claim that the reasons firms use put options are: 
first, “in the US the premium is not taxable and falls directly to the bottom line”13, but it 
could not be reported as earnings. Second, it is an effective technique to acquire a large 
number of shares at undervalued prices while avoiding SEC trading limitations, 
especially relating to the rule that repurchase not exceed 25% of daily trading volume.14 
Third, firms with bullish expectations will sell the put to collect the overvalued 
                                                 
 
 
13 On page 50 of Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) 
14 SEC adopted rule 10b-18 in November 1982. The rule is a “safe harbor” that provides legal protection 
against price manipulation lawsuits. The adoption reduced litigation uncertainty and paved the road for a 
rapid increase in share repurchase programs since 1982. There are four trading limits that should be applied 
every trading day: 
1. All trades are made through only one dealer (the dealer can be changed every day, but not during the 
day). 
2. Trades may not be executed at the opening or at the last half hour of trade. 
3. Trades may not be executed at a price exciting the maximum of the highest current independent bid and 
the last independent sale price. 
4. The total repurchase volume must not exceed 25% of the average daily trading volume (excluding block 
trades, so stock bought under a put derivatives agreement is excluded from the daily limit) calculated over 
the preceding four calendar weeks. 
The rule does not apply to trades executed for employee stock ownership plans, nor does it apply to prices 
or volumes set for self-tender offers or off-market trades. 
An extension of the SEC rule is The 1991 SEC Non-action Letter. 
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premiums. This is a cost-effective way of accumulating firm stock in an orderly manner, 
which would be difficult to do on the stock exchange.  
When firms sell puts on their stock they forgo the inherent flexibility that 
explicitly motivates their stock repurchase programs. (I infer this to be a very strong and 
very efficient signal.)  
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) claim that: “Although these synthetic products are 
widely discussed in practice, determining the actual extent of their use is difficult because 
most firms disclose little about their use of such contracts to investors.”15 Furthermore, in 
1986 the US government increased the capital gains tax rate without making any changes 
in the dividend tax rate. 
                                                 
 
 
15 From page 51 
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III. Hypotheses and Methodology  
This research examines the extent to which synthetic repurchase programs 
enhance: (a) shareholder value, (b) informational efficiency, and (c) transactional 
efficiency. I review the theoretical rationale for the separate use of put derivatives and 
stock repurchase programs. I form joint hypotheses to examine the use of put options as a 
mechanism to enhance a repurchase program. 
I collect a unique sample of firms involved in synthetic repurchase to examine the 
hypothesis. I examine (a) characteristics of synthetic repurchase transaction, (b) 
characteristics of the selling firm, and (c) characteristics of the intermediaries initiating 
the transaction. I compare the characteristics of sample firms to samples of firms with 
and without active repurchase programs. 
I empirically investigate (a) prior and post financial performance and profiles of 
the sample firms; (b) the financial performance and profile of two control samples of 
industry-and-size matched firms and; (c) stoke price reaction and analyst forecast 
revisions to repurchase announcements in for different event windows; (d) Long-run 
book-to-market and size-adjusted performance of firms with an ongoing synthetic 
repurchase program; 
My empirical results support the signaling hypotheses as an explanation for the 
motivation behind synthetic repurchase programs. 
I employ several approaches to investigate synthetic repurchase programs.  I 
compare the financial profiles of firms from five years to one year prior to the start of 
synthetic repurchase to firms’ financial profiles one year to five years subsequent to the 
time firms began to use synthetic repurchase. I compare profiles of firms involved in 
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synthetic repurchase to two industry-and-size-matched control samples of firms with and 
with no ongoing share repurchase programs.  
Also, I investigate stock price reaction and analyst forecast revisions to 
repurchase announcements in for different event windows. 
Taking into account the high uncertainty of research outcomes proxied by R&D 
expenditures I would like to examine the medium term stock price performance. I 
compare the average long-term buy-and-hold stock returns to the average market returns. 
To accomplish this goal, I use the buy-and hold methodology developed by Lyon, Barber 
and Tsai (1999) to test the long-term stock performance of firms with synthetic 
repurchase programs. Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) find that the average 
market reaction to open market repurchase announcement is 4% compared to 12.6% for 
three-year-long-run abnormal market over performance and to a 15% reaction to tender 
offer repurchase announcements. They also find that the top quintile of value stocks 
(highest book-to-market ratios) over performs the market by 34.3% for the three years 
following the announcement. The top quintile of growth stocks (lowest book-to-market 
ratios) under performs the market but not statistically significantly different from zero  
A. Hypotheses 
I develop several hypotheses to enable me to test statistically whether synthetic 
repurchase enhances firm’s value.  
1. Signaling Hypothesis 
When managers of a firm believe that its stock is undervalued, they chose to 
initiate synthetic repurchase. This sends a signal to investors and alerts them that the 
actual condition of the firm is better than its market valuation. Thus the firm distinguishes 
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itself from other firms with stock repurchase programs and high uncertainty of future 
earnings as proxied by high R&D expenditures.  
I want to find if the synthetic repurchase is sending a new signal, different from 
the signal already sent by ongoing open market repurchase program. I also want to 
confirm or refute the management claims from the firms 10-K, 10-Q and proxy 
statements that synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives is enhancing the 
ongoing open market share repurchase program. So I develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Ho: There is no Information Signaling in the Initiation of Synthetic 
Repurchase Program 
Ha: There is Information Signaling in the Initiation of Synthetic Repurchase 
 
B. Models 
1. Model Applied for Computing the Stock Price Reaction and Analyst Forecast 
Revisions to Repurchase Announcements in for Different Event Windows 
Event Windows: 
In order to test if there is signaling I examine four different event windows i.e. I 
assign firm repurchase announcements in four different time windows:  
The first event I examine is the Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to the 
Synthetic Window, which represents the first announcement of a “plain vanilla” open 
market repurchase program by firms that subsequently were involved in a synthetic 
program. 
The second event I examine is the aggregation of all Subsequent Repurchase 
Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window, which represent all 
subsequent repurchase announcements that firms have made prior to the synthetic 
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window. This is an aggregation of all “plain vanilla” open market repurchase 
announcements before the initiation of the synthetic repurchase program through put 
derivatives. This are new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an 
ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open 
market repurchase programs from firms that have already done a repurchase. 
Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all 
new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market 
repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase 
programs for the duration of synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives;  
Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window 
represents new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing 
open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market 
repurchase programs after the termination of a synthetic repurchase program through put 
derivatives. 
Techniques: 
I use two techniques. First one is the Market Model Event Study, where I proxy 
the market index with “CRSP Equally Weighted Index”. My announcement window is 
from day 0 to day 1. I examine the results from day –60 to day 60. My model estimation 
window is from day –120 to day –61. 
The second technique I perform is Event Study of the Analyst Forecast Revisions 
of EPS (Earnings per Share) for current year, following year, and five year growth. EPS 
Forecast Revisions are normalized using Share Price. Five Year Growth Forecast 
Revisions are normalized using prior month Five Year Growth Forecast. Expected 
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Forecast Revisions are estimated using fourth order moving average model. Forecasted 
component of the model is estimated using all available months excluding window 
covering six months prior to the event month and six months following the event month. 
Listed revisions are measured over an interval beginning on the event month and ending 
on the second month. 
2. Model Applied for Computing the Long-Run Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
The buy-and-hold methodology I use to test the long-term performance of firms 
repurchasing their own shares is as follows. 
For data collection I use the Center for Research in Security Prices and 
CompuStat. First, I divide all the firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange into 
deciles according to size.16 I add all the firms traded on the American Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ. Because the smallest deciles by market value include approximately half 
of the firms, I re-divide it into five new portfolios. I construct fourteen portfolios of firms 
of approximately the same size, and divide each into quintiles by book value-to-market 
value according to values as of December of the previous year.  
I rebalance all 70 portfolios (14 portfolios times the 5 new portfolios) yearly. For 
delisted firms I use the portfolio mean return. The yearly return is computed as minus one 
plus twelve times the sum of one plus monthly return. For the portfolio returns, I use 
equally weighted average returns.  
The firm abnormal return is computed as the difference between the firm return 
and the corresponding size and book-to-market value portfolio return. T-statistics are 
bootstrapped and skewness adjusted.  The equations are: 
                                                 
16 Market capitalization for the quarter under study 
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The yearly return, R, for a firm is the product of the monthly returns, Ri, over the 
year. The abnormal return, AR, for a firm is computed as the yearly return minus the 
(equally weighted) average return of a firm from the corresponding size- and book-to-
market-matched  portfolio. 
C. Theoretical Prior for the Signaling Hypothesis. 
1. Hypotheses Testable with Financial Profiles 
I use the Healy and Palepu (1988) methodology to examine  financial profiles. To 
be consistent with signaling hypothesis, I would expect R&D expenditures and their rates 
of change to increase several years prior to the event; earnings and its rate of change to 
increase around and subsequent to the event; and cash and cash equivalents, total assets 
and market value and their rates of change to increase subsequent to the event.  
2. Hypotheses Testable with Financial Profiles of Industry-and-Size-Matched 
Portfolio of Firms without Repurchase Program 
I construct industry-and-size-matched portfolios to benchmark the results. I use 
the Healy and Palepu (1988) methodology, as extended by Gombola and Tsetsekos 
(1992) to compare the two portfolios. To be consistent with signaling hypothesis, I would 
expect no statistically significant change in R&D expenditures, earnings, cash and cash 
equivalents, total assets and market value and their rates of change between years for the 
matched firms. Also I would anticipate a statistically significant difference between the 
two portfolios.  
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3. Hypotheses Testable with the Financial Profiles of Industry-and-Size-Matched 
Portfolios of Firms with Repurchases Program 
I construct an industry-and-size-matched portfolio of firms that have an ongoing 
repurchase program to benchmark the results and to take into account the confounding 
condition of firms having ongoing repurchase programs. I use the Healy and Palepu 
(1988) methodology to examine the financial profiles of two portfolios. To be consistent 
with signaling hypothesis, I would expect less statistically positive changes in R&D 
expenditures, earnings, cash and cash equivalents, total assets and market value and their 
rates of change between years, than in the original portfolio of firms with synthetic 
repurchase programs. Also, I would expect statistically smaller changes in R&D 
expenditures, earnings, cash and cash equivalents, total assets and market value and the 
rates of change compared to the two portfolios. 
4. Market Model Event Study 
For the Market Model Event Study for the four different event windows that I am 
examining the prior theoretical expectorations consistent with signaling hypothesis are as 
follow: 
I expect significant positive average abnormal return at the initial repurchase 
announcement for all firms and in my study for the firms, which are going to sell, put 
derivatives subsequently. As previous research have shown this is the transition of the 
main positive signal of the open market repurchase announcement. The first 
announcement significantly reduces the asymmetric information between the 
management of the firm and market participants. 
I expect less significant to zero average abnormal return at subsequent repurchase 
announcements before synthetic repurchase program initiation, because the main positive 
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signal of the open market repurchase announcements have been transmitted to the market 
and the asymmetric information between the management of the firm and market 
participants have been significantly reduced. 
I expect significant positive average abnormal return at the repurchase 
announcements during synthetic repurchase program. The initiation of the synthetic 
repurchase program is a positive signal from management that the market participants 
receive and I expected to be strong positive signal. Repurchase announcements during the 
duration of the synthetic repurchase program are new announcements of either 
continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or 
announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs during the 
duration of synthetic repurchase program and I expect this announcement to be viewed 
from the market participants in a completely new way different from similar 
announcements before the transition of the signal, i.e. before the initiation of the synthetic 
repurchase program, i.e. before the upgrading from an open market stock repurchase 
program to synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. 
I expect negative to zero average abnormal return at the repurchase 
announcements after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program. The 
termination of the synthetic repurchase program is a signal from management that the 
market participants receive and I expected to be strong negative signal. Repurchase 
announcements after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program are new 
announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market 
repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase 
programs after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program through put 
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derivatives and I expect this announcements to be viewed from the market participants in 
a completely new way different from similar announcements before the transition of the 
negative signal, i.e. before the termination of the of the synthetic repurchase program, i.e. 
before the downgrading from an synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives to 
an open market stock repurchase program. 
5. Event Study of the Analyst Forecast Revisions 
For the event study of average analyst forecast revisions for the four different 
event windows that I am examining the prior theoretical expectorations consistent with 
signaling hypothesis are as follow: 
I expect positive average analyst forecast revisions both for current and following 
year earnings at the initial repurchase announcement for all firms and in my study for the 
firms, which are going to sell put derivatives subsequently. As previous research have 
shown this is the transition of the main positive signal of the open market repurchase 
announcement. The first announcement significantly reduces the asymmetric information 
between the management of the firm and market participants. 
I expect negative to zero average analyst forecast revisions both for current and 
following year earnings at subsequent repurchase announcements before synthetic 
repurchase program initiation, because the main positive signal of the open market 
repurchase announcements have been transmitted to the market and the asymmetric 
information between the management of the firm and market participants have been 
significantly reduced. But now the firm management is confirming that they have run out 
of profitable investment opportunities, so the analyst would revise their earnings 
expectations downwards. 
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I expect significant positive average analyst forecast revisions both for current 
and following year earnings at the repurchase announcements during synthetic repurchase 
program. The initiation of the synthetic repurchase program is a positive signal from 
management that the market participants receive and I expected to be strong positive 
signal. Repurchase announcements during the duration of synthetic repurchase program 
are new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open 
market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market 
repurchase programs during the duration of synthetic repurchase program and I expect 
this announcement to be viewed from the market participants in a completely new way 
different from similar announcements before the transition of the signal, i.e. before the 
initiation of the synthetic repurchase program, i.e. before the upgrading from an open 
market stock repurchase program to synthetic repurchase program through put 
derivatives. 
I expect negative to zero average analyst forecast revisions both for current and 
following year earnings at the repurchase announcements after the termination of the 
synthetic repurchase program. The termination of the synthetic repurchase program is a 
negative signal from management that the market participants receive and I expected to 
be a negative signal. Repurchase announcements after the termination of the synthetic 
repurchase program are new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an 
ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open 
market repurchase programs after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program 
and I expect this announcements to be viewed from the market participants in a 
completely new way different from similar announcements before the transition of the 
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negative signal, i.e. before the termination of the of the synthetic repurchase program, i.e. 
before the downgrading from an synthetic repurchase program to an open market stock 
repurchase program. 
6. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
I also, I compare the average long-term buy-and-hold stock returns to the average 
market returns. To accomplish this goal, I use the buy-and hold methodology developed 
by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) to test the long-term stock performance of firms with 
synthetic repurchase programs. To be consistent with signaling hypothesis, I would 
expect to find positive and statistically significant risk-adjusted market overperformance.  
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IV. Data 
A. Portfolio of Firms Involved in Synthetic Repurchase 
To examine the use of synthetic repurchase programs, I first collect a sample of 
all available firms that sold put options. I search the 10-K and 10-Q statements for the 
last 12 years from January 1988 through December 1999. I explore Lexis®-Nexis® 
database for the whole period and have supplemented the data using the SEC EDGAR 
filings database from January 1994 through December 1999. 
 There were 18,432 10-K or 10-Q statements with at least one of the phrases “put 
derivative,” “put option,” “equity put,” “put feature,” “stock put,” “put provision,” “put 
the shares,” “Sale of put,” “sold put,” “put sold” or “rights to put” representing 383 firms. 
Of the 383 firms, 117 firms used the put as a debt guarantee, five investment banks traded 
exotic currency options, 3 insurance firms used the put option for financial engineering or 
reinsurance, 213 were unconnected to my study occurrences of the used phrases and 53 
firms used their own stock as the underlying asset in the issue of put derivatives in 
connection with a stock repurchase program. These 53 firms came from 34 industries as 
indicated by their four-digit SIC codes. 
B. Developing Two Control Samples: Industry-and-Size-Matched Firms 
with and without Stock Repurchase Programs 
 To identify two control portfolios I use Compustat to find all the firms with the 
same four-digit SIC code at the year of the event; there are 2,322 firms. I use CRSP to 
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find the market value of all the firms with the same four-digit SIC codes at the end of the 
previous quarter. 17  
I extract from SDC Platinum 7,398 firms with ongoing share repurchase 
programs.  We find which of the 2,322 firms are not in my initial portfolio of 53 firms but 
have ongoing share repurchase programs. For each of the 53 firms I locate the three 
closest by size firms with and with no repurchase programs as of the end of the previous 
quarter, and combine them in two separate control portfolios.  
I construct one portfolio to consist of 12218 industry-and-size-matched firms that 
have ongoing stock repurchase programs. I construct another to consist of 122 industry-
and-size-matched firms with no stock repurchase programs. 
C. Profile of Firms That Engage in Synthetic Repurchase 
The firms involved in synthetic repurchase exhibit the following characteristics: 
53 firms have reported use of the put option as a part of its share repurchase program; 6 
issues were negotiated with an investment bank; 10 were negotiated with independent 
third parties, 14 were privately placed (1 with Trusts of the Bohen family, 13 were not 
reported) and only one was a open market put option issuance. American option exercise 
was assumed 10 times; European was stated in the 10-Q or 10-K statements 19 times; 
exotic was stated twice and for 14 firms I were unable to find data. Of the 53 options 
sold, only 2 options were exercised. 11 firms are reporting that they are selling put 
options and buying call options as a package.19   
                                                 
 
 
17 The quarter before the firm starts to sell put options on its own stock. 
18 Microsoft and Oracle are the two biggest firms with 7372 SIC code. Therefore they are compared to 
three identical firms for the corresponding dates they start their put programs. 
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The mean size of the first issue of put derivatives on the selling firm stock was a 
1,404,678 share contract (standard deviation of 1,114,802). The minimum was 50,000 
shares, median 1,156,000 and the maximum 4,000,000.  
The average put option premium on the selling firm stock was $5,333,260 
(standard deviation $9,947,345). The minimum was $31,304, median $1,910,500, and the 
maximum $49,000,000. The average maximum potential repurchase obligation was 
$39,069,385 (standard deviation $43,973,762).20 The minimum was $375,000, median 
$24,900,000 and the maximum $203,000,000.  
ADMINISTAFF INC (ASF) is the one announced in 1999.  There are no 
available data in COMPUSTAT for OCTEL Corporation (OTL) till the year of the 
synthetic repurchase program announcement 1992, including 1992. The research firm 
OCTEL COMMUNICATIONS Corporation (OCTL) is different. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 Usually an Investment bank is the counter party and the price of the option is not stated and the only 
thing stated in the 10-Q or 10-K report is the fact that the price of the put option is equal to the price of the 
call option and there is no cash outlay at the time of the contract initiation. 
20 As suggested by Higgins the Ratio of the Maximum Put Repurchase Obligation to the Size of the 
ongoing repurchases program is going to be computed. 
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Table 6, Panel 1: Data availability 
 
Date of Put Start Availability Number of firms that have reported the
corresponding time period
Assumed date 8
Assumed month 16
Exact date 9
Exact month 11
Quarter 5
Year 4
Total # of firms 53
 
Table 6, Panel 2: SIC codes 
 
The 1 digit SIC of the companies
initiating synthetic repurchase
programs
Number of firms with that 1 digit SIC
1 5
2 5
3 18
5 4
6 10
7 8
8 3
Total # of firms 53
 
There are 28 2-digit SIC represented by our firms. There are maximum 8 within one 2-digit SIC. 
There are 39 3-digit SIC represented by our firms. There are maximum 7 within one 3-digit SIC. 
 
 
The average gap in months between the initiation and termination of a synthetic 
repurchase program is 23 moths for the 22 firms that have terminated their synthetic 
repurchase program. There are also 31 firms with an ongoing share repurchase program 
as of January 2000. The average number of months between the termination of a 
synthetic program and the end of the period under consideration is 22 months. 
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V. Result and Discussion 
I report the following results using three different methodologies.   
A. Evidence from Financial Profiles 
I examine the Compustat accounting variables of the three portfolios. I also 
examine rates of change in variables for the year in which the firm started synthetic 
repurchase, the previous five years and the next five years, and report the results in Table 
7. I composed the two portfolios of rival firms by matching the three closest by size firms 
with and with no repurchase programs as of the end of the previous quarter from the same 
industry. The average total assets for each of the three portfolios are the same for the year 
zero. After adjusting for the size of firms by normalizing by the total assets, I obtain the 
same results for the financial profiles. I report the unadjusted results in order to 
emphasize the size of the assets. 
The increases in adjusted market value and total assets and their rates of change 
are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the portfolio of synthetic repurchase firms 
(Table 7 Panels 1A and 1B), compared to no statistically significant difference in the 
matched portfolio of firms with repurchase programs and declines in the measures for the 
matched portfolio of firms with no repurchase. These results support the notion that 
synthetic repurchase firms are undervalued, and also support the signaling hypothesis.  
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Table 7, Panel 1 A: Total Assets 
Average Total Assets and the p-values for comparison within and between the 
synthetic repurchase firms portfolio and matching samples 
RY is relative year to the firm started synthetic repurchase; Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the portfolio 
of firms that have synthetic repurchase programs; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without 
Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase 
program; p-value is the computed p-value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two 
portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding 
portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding 
portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; 
Average (Assets-Total) is the mean total assets for parallel relative year and corresponding portfolio 
RY Average (Total Assets) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
-5 $2,017 $3,128 $2,954 -$1,111 -$937 $174
-4 $2,139 $3,328 $2,859 -$1,190 -$721 $469
-3 $2,275 $3,449 $3,074 -$1,173 -$798 $375
-2 $2,678 $3,343 $3,201 -$665 -$523 $142
-1 $3,085 $3,542 $3,467 -$457 -$381 $75
0 $3,967 $3,947 $3,780 $20 $187 $167
1 $4,370 $2,231 $2,752 $2,139** $1,618 -$521
2 $4,077 $2,192 $641 $1,885* $3,436*** $1,551***
3 $5,716 $2,073 $964 $3,643*** $4,751*** $1,109
4 $7,863 $1,839 $652 $6,024*** $7,211*** $1,187**
5 $9,322 $2,382 $698 $6,940*** $8,624*** $1,684**
 
 (-5,5) $7,305*** -$746 -$2,256
 (-5,0) $1,950* $819 $826 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years
 ( 0,5) $5,355** -$1,565 -$3,082
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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Table 7, Panel 1 B: Rate of change of Total Assets 
Average Rate of Change of Total Assets and the p-values for comparison within 
and between the synthetic repurchase firms portfolio and matching samples 
RY is relative year to the firm started synthetic repurchase; Synthetic Repurchase Firms is the portfolio 
of firms that have synthetic repurchase ; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of 
industry-and-size-matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is 
the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is 
the computed p-value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) 
is the computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average Rate of Change 
(Assets-Total) is the mean Rate of Change of total assets for parallel relative year and corresponding 
portfolio 
RY Rate of Change (TotalAssets) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurcha
se Firms  
Matched Firms with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
(-6,-5) $279 $689 $261 -$411 $18 $429
(-5,-4) $195 $392 $538 -$197 -$343 -$146
(-4,-3) $205 $497 $300 -$292 -$95 $197
(-3,-2) $470 $297 $441 $172 $29 -$144
(-2,-1) $437 $373 $692 $64 -$255 -$320
(-1,0) $814 $357 $587 $457 $226 -$230
(0,1) $557 $406 $168 $151 $389* $238
(1,2) $732 $341 $190 $391 $542*** $151
(2,3) $942 $146 $225 $796*** $716** -$79
(3,4) 
$2,3
13 $49 $160 $2,264*** $2,153*** -$111
(4,5) 
$1,7
99 $522 $74 $1,277 $1,725** $448
 
 (-5,5) 
$1,5
20** -$167 -$187
 (-5,0) $535 -$332 $326 Test of Equality of Rate of Change Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $986 $165 -$513
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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The increase in cash and cash equivalents (Table 7 Panels 2A and 2B) is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and the increase in the rate of change of cash and 
cash equivalents is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for the portfolio of synthetic 
repurchase firms. There is no statistically significant difference in the matched portfolio 
of firms with repurchase, and there is a decline in cash and cash equivalents in the 
matched portfolio of firms with no repurchase. This difference between the portfolio of 
synthetic repurchase firms and the two matching portfolios for cash and cash equivalents 
is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for years from 1 through 5 and the difference in 
rate of change of cash and cash equivalents, are statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
for years 3 and 4. These findings support two hypotheses. The signaling hypothesis is the 
first one. I am also unable to reject the hypothesis that firms involved in synthetic 
repurchase improve transactional efficiency, to finesse the 25% SEC limit and to match 
future cash flows with the future obligation to repurchase stock. The statistical 
differences between all financial profile variables for the years for the three portfolios 
support the signaling hypothesis.  
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Table 7, Panel 2 A: Cash and Equivalents 
Average Cash and Equivalents and the t-values for comparison within and 
between the put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average (Cash and 
Equivalents) is the mean cash and equivalents for parallel relative year and corresponding portfolio 
RY Average (Cash andEquivalents) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
-5 $247 $185 $298 $62 -$52 -$113
-4 $296 $214 $273 $82 $22 -$60
-3 $241 $265 $343 -$24 -$101 -$77
-2 $312 $251 $383 $61 -$71 -$133
-1 $372 $271 $366 $101 $7 -$94
 $461 $279 $407 $182 $54 -$128
1 $540 $247 $349 $293* $191 -$101
2 $747 $262 $81 $484** $666*** $181***
3 $1,316 $151 $68 $1,165*** $1,248*** $83**
4 $1,554 $189 $102 $1,365*** $1,452*** $87*
5 $1,517 $231 $117 $1,287*** $1,400*** $114**
 
 (-5,5) $1,270** $45 -$181
 (-5,0) $215 $94 $109 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $1,056** -$49 -$290
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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Table 7, Panel 2 B: Rate of change of Cash and Equivalents 
Average Rate of Change of Cash and Equivalents and the t-values for 
comparison within and between the put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average Rate of Change 
(Cash and Equivalents) is the mean Rate of Change of cash and equivalents for parallel relative year and 
corresponding portfolio 
RY Rate of Change(Cash and Equivalents) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
(-6,-5) $9 $1 -$46 $8 $55 $47
(-5,-4) $62 $41 $36 $21 $27 $5
(-4,-3) -$42 $69 $80 -$112 -$122 -$11
(-3,-2) $80 $15 $96 $65 -$16 -$81
(-2,-1) $71 $37 $27 $34 $44 $10
(-1,0) $82 $4 $73 $78 $9 -$69
(0,1) $62 $37 -$6 $25 $68 $42
(1,2) $139 -$4 $41 $143 $99 -$45
(2,3) $372 $23 $5 $350** $367** $18
(3,4) $433 $45 $41 $388* $392* $4
(4,5) $499 $49 $26 $450 $473 $23
 
 (-5,5) $490 $48 $72
 (-5,0) $73 $3 $120 Test of Equality of Rate of Change Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $417 $45 -$48
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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The increase in R&D expense is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the 
increase in the rate of change is statistically significant at the 0.10 level for portfolio of 
synthetic repurchase firms, compared to no statistical difference both matched portfolios 
(Table 7, Panels 3A and 3B). This difference between the R&D expense of the portfolio 
of put firms and the matching portfolio with repurchase is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level for years -1 through 5, and the corresponding rate of change is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level for years -2 through 0. The same difference between the R&D 
expense of the portfolio of synthetic repurchase firms and the matching portfolio with no 
repurchase is statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the whole sample period (years -
5 to 5), and the corresponding rate of change is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
for almost the whole sample period. These results support the hypothesis that synthetic 
repurchase firms are undervalued and thereby support the signaling hypothesis. 
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Table 7, Panel 3 A: R&D Expense 
Average R&D Expense and the t-values for comparison within and between the 
put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average (R&D Expense) is 
the mean research and  development expense  for parallel relative year and corresponding portfolio 
RY Average (R&D Expense) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
-5 $101 $75 $16 $26 $85** $59**
-4 $102 $74 $26 $28 $76** $47*
-3 $113 $69 $28 $44 $86** $41
-2 $121 $67 $20 $54 $101*** $47**
-1 $174 $71 $21 $103** $153*** $50**
 $220 $76 $23 $143** $197*** $54***
1 $268 $119 $27 $149** $241*** $92***
2 $429 $187 $32 $242** $397*** $155***
3 $467 $120 $23 $347*** $445*** $98**
4 $562 $101 $29 $460*** $532*** $72**
5 $546 $138 $37 $408** $509*** $101*
 
 (-5,5) $445** $63 $21
 (-5,0) $119 $1 $7 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $326 $61 $15
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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Table 7, Panel 3 B: Rate of change of R&D Expense  
Average Rate of Change of R&D Expense and the t-values for comparison 
within and between the put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average Rate of Change 
(R&D Expense) is the mean Rate of Change of research and  development expense  for parallel relative 
year and corresponding portfolio 
RY Rate of Change (R&DExpense) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase 
(-6,-5) $17 $9 $4 $8 $13** $5
(-5,-4) $13 $7 $13 $5 $0 -$6
(-4,-3) $16 $8 $2 $8 $14 $6
(-3,-2) $18 $5 -$6 $13* $24* $11
(-2,-1) $53 $11 $4 $42** $50** $7
(-1,0) $43 $7 $2 $36** $41*** $5
(0,1) $25 $37 $6 -$12 $19 $31**
(1,2) $115 $47 $6 $68 $109*** $40
(2,3) $24 -$25 $9 $49 $15 -$34
(3,4) $94 -$21 $8 $115 $86** -$29
(4,5) $150 $27 $12 $123* $138* $15
 
 (-5,5) $133* $18* $8
 (-5,0) $26 -$1 -$2 Test of Equality of Rate of Change Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $106 $20** $10***
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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The differences in the means of price-deflated earnings, as used by Healy and 
Palepu (1988), between event portfolio and the matching portfolios for years –1 through 
5, are statistically significantly different at the 0.05 level. Increases in earnings before 
interest & taxes (EBIT) and in rates of change are statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
within portfolios of synthetic repurchase firms (Table 7, Panel 4A, 4B, and 4C).  There is 
a less significant increase in the matched portfolio of firms with repurchase programs, 
and there is no statistical difference in the matched portfolio of firms with no repurchase 
programs. This difference between the portfolio of “synthetic repurchase firms” and the 
two matching portfolios for the average EBIT and their rate of change is statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level for years –1 to 5. These results support the hypothesis that the 
synthetic repurchase firms are undervalued and thereby supports the signaling hypothesis. 
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Table 7, Panel 4 A: EBIT 
Average Earnings Before Interest & Taxes and the t-values for comparison 
within and between the put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average (Earnings Before 
Interest & Taxes) is the mean Earnings Before Interest & Taxes for parallel relative year and 
corresponding portfolio 
RY Average (EBIT) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
-5 $164 $158 $92 $5 $72 $66
-4 $217 $181 $91 $35 $126** $90*
-3 $249 $198 $116 $51 $134** $82
-2 $298 $214 $128 $85 $171** $86
-1 $381 $218 $127 $163** $255*** $91*
 $471 $235 $128 $236*** $343*** $107*
1 $539 $214 $88 $325*** $451*** $126**
2 $641 $222 $44 $419*** $597*** $178***
3 $942 $214 $68 $727*** $874*** $146**
4 $1,350 $317 $102 $1,033*** $1,247*** $214**
5 $1,358 $361 $81 $997** $1,277** $280**
 
 (-5,5) $1,194*** $202** -$11
 (-5,0) $307** $77 $36 Test of Equality of Averages Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $887** $125 -$48
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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Table 7, Panel 4 B: Rate of change of EBIT 
Average Rate of Change of Earnings Before Interest & Taxes and the t-values 
for comparison within and between the put firms portfolio and matching samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have writhen Put options in order to enhance their 
repurchase program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-
matched firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms without Repurchase is the comparison 
portfolio of industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-
value for the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios; p-value (-5,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (-5,0) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the 
computed p-value for the relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average Rate of Change 
(Earnings Before Interest & Taxes) is the mean Rate of Change of earnings before interest and taxes for 
parallel relative year and corresponding portfolio 
RY Rate of Change (EBIT) Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
without 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
(-6,-5) $28 $25 $18 $3 $10 $7
(-5,-4) $63 $33 $15 $30 $48* $18
(-4,-3) $40 $38 $30 $2 $10 $8
(-3,-2) $57 $37 $18 $20 $40 $20
(-2,-1) $84 $17 $14 $67** $70*** $3
(-1,0) $81 $15 $9 $67* $72*** $6
(0,1) $59 $40 $14 $19 $45 $25
(1,2) $172 $9 $3 $163** $168*** $6
(2,3) $178 $18 $1 $160* $177* $17
(3,4) $366 $55 $31 $311*** $335*** $24
(4,5) $221 $5 -$17 $216 $238 $22
 
 (-5,5) $193 -$20 -$34
 (-5,0) $54 -$10 -$8 Test of Equality of Rate of Change Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $139 -$10 -$26
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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Table 7, Panel 4 C: Price-adjusted EBIT 
Average Price-Adjusted Difference of Earnings Before Interest & Taxes and 
the t-values for comparison within and between the put firms portfolio and matching 
samples. 
RY is relative year to the firm started selling put derivatives in order to enhance its share repurchase 
program; Put Firms is the portfolio of firms that have sold put options in order to enhance their repurchase 
program; Matched Firms with Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of industry-and-size-matched 
firms with stock repurchase program; Matched Firms with no Repurchase is the comparison portfolio of 
industry-and-size-matched firms without stock repurchase program; p-value is the computed p-value for 
the parallel relative year between the corresponding two portfolios;    p-value (-5,5) is the computed p-
value for the relative years – 5 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; ;  p-value (-5,0) is the computed p-value 
for the relative years – 5 and 0  for corresponding portfolio; ; p-value (0,5) is the computed p-value for the 
relative years 0 and 5  for corresponding portfolio; Average (EBIT Adjusted) is the mean Price-Adjusted 
Difference of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes for parallel relative year and corresponding portfolio 
RY [EBIT(t) - EBIT(t-1)] /Price Difference Between Portfolios
  
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms  
Matched Firms 
with 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
with no 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase 
Firms & Matched 
Firms with 
Repurchase 
Synthetic 
Repurchase Firm 
& Matched Firms 
with no 
Repurchase 
Matched Firms 
with no 
Repurchase & 
Matched Firms 
with Repurchase
(-6,-5) $28 $25 $18 $3 $10 $7
(-5,-4) $63 $33 $15 $30 $48* $18
(-4,-3) $40 $38 $30 $2 $10 $8
(-3,-2) $57 $37 $18 $20 $40 $20
(-2,-1) $84 $17 $14 $67** $70*** $3
(-1,0) $81 $15 $9 $67* $72*** $6
(0,1) $59 $40 $14 $19 $45 $25
(1,2) $172 $9 $3 $163** $168*** $6
(2,3) $178 $18 $1 $160* $177* $17
(3,4) $366 $55 $31 $311*** $335*** $24
(4,5) $221 $5 -$17 $216 $238 $22
 
 (-5,5) $193 -$20 -$34
 (-5,0) $54 -$10 -$8         Test of Equality of Rate of Change Across Years 
 ( 0,5) $139 -$10 -$26
             
 
*** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* the p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
Note:  The calculations performed with the accounting variables normalized by total assets yield very 
similar results. 
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B.  Market Model Event Study and Event Study of the Analyst Forecast 
Revisions for the Four Different Event Windows 
1. Market Model Event Study 
The empirical results for the four different event windows that I am examining are 
discussed below and summarized in Table 8. 
I find positive 1.94% average abnormal return, at the time of the initial repurchase 
announcement for all firms in my study (i.e. firms that are going to sell, put derivatives 
subsequently), which is significant at the 1%-level. I have significant t-statistics with p-
value of 0.013 for the one tale test, significant Z-statistic with p-value of 0.000 and 
significant Wilcoxon t-statistics with p-value of 0.013 for the test of significance of the 
difference between the firms that have positive average abnormal return at the initial 
repurchase announcement and firms that have negative average abnormal return at the 
initial repurchase announcement. This confirms the findings of previous research and also 
it confirms the hypothesis that the initial announcement is the transition of the main 
positive signal of the open market repurchase announcement. The first announcement 
significantly reduces the asymmetric information between the management of the firm 
and market participants. 
 I find not statistically significant 0.60% average abnormal return at subsequent 
repurchase announcements before synthetic repurchase program initiation. I have non-
significant t-statistics with p-value of 0.199 for the one tale test, non-significant Z-
statistic with p-value of 0.143 and non-significant Wilcoxon t-statistics with p-value of 
0.112 for the test of significance of the difference between the firms that have positive 
average abnormal return at the initial repurchase announcement and firms that have 
negative average abnormal return at the initial repurchase announcement. This confirms 
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previous findings that the main positive signal of the open market repurchase 
announcements have been transmitted to the market and the asymmetric information 
between the management of the firm and market participants have been significantly 
reduced. 
 I find positive 1.23% average abnormal return, at the at the repurchase 
announcements during synthetic repurchase program, which is significant at the 1%-
level. I have significant t-statistics with p-value of 0.048 for the one tale test, significant 
Z-statistic with p-value of 0.001 and significant Wilcoxon t-statistics with p-value of 
0.013 for the test of significance of the difference between the firms that have positive 
average abnormal return at the at the repurchase announcements during synthetic 
repurchase program and firms that have negative average abnormal return at the at the 
repurchase announcements during synthetic repurchase program. These results 
empirically confirm my theoretical hypothesis that the initiation of the synthetic 
repurchase program is a positive signal from management that the market participants 
receive. I confirm it to be strong positive signal. Repurchase announcements during the 
duration of the synthetic repurchase program are new announcements of either 
continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or 
announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs during the 
duration of synthetic repurchase program and I expect this announcement to be viewed 
from the market participants in a completely new way different from similar 
announcements before the transition of the positive signal, i.e. before the initiation of the 
synthetic repurchase program, i.e. before the upgrading from an open market stock 
repurchase program to synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. 
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 I find negative –1.50% average abnormal return, at the at the repurchase 
announcements after termination of synthetic repurchase program, which is not 
statistically different from zero. I have non-significant t-statistics with p-value of 0.250 
for the one tale test, non-significant Z-statistic with p-value of 0.992 and non-significant 
Wilcoxon t-statistics with p-value of 0.337 for the test of significance of the difference 
between the firms that have positive average abnormal return at the at the repurchase 
announcements after the termination of synthetic repurchase program and firms that have 
negative average abnormal return at the at the repurchase announcements after the 
termination of synthetic repurchase program. These results empirically confirm my 
theoretical hypothesis that the termination of the synthetic repurchase program is a 
negative signal from management that the market participants receive. Repurchase 
announcements after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program are new 
announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market 
repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase 
programs after the termination of the synthetic repurchase program and I find that this 
announcements is viewed from the market participants in a completely new way different 
from similar announcements before the transition of the negative signal, i.e. before the 
termination of the of the synthetic repurchase program, i.e. before the downgrading from 
an synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives to an open market stock 
repurchase program. 
I have found empirical confirmation of the signaling hypothesis for the synthetic 
repurchases. My results empirically confirm my theoretical hypothesis that the initiation 
of the synthetic repurchase program offers a positive signal to the market. Also, my 
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empirical results confirm my theoretical hypothesis that the termination of the synthetic 
repurchase program is a negative signal to the market. The market reacts positively to the 
initiation of a synthetic repurchase program and upon termination market reacts 
negatively. 
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Table 8: Market model event study for days (0,1) 
Windows Examined represents the for different event windows in which I assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine them; # of 
observations is the number of observations that I have for each event window; Average Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-adjusted average abnormal 
return; Median Abnormal Return is the market-model risk-adjusted median abnormal return; T-STAT is the student t statistic measuring the difference from 
zero of the Average Abnormal Return; P-VAL is the corresponding P-value for the T-STAT; Z-STAT is the Z statistic measuring the difference from zero of the 
Average Abnormal Return; P-VAL is the corresponding P-value for the Z-STAT; %NEG is the percentage of Analyst who are downgrading there Earnings 
Forecast Revisions; %POS is the percentage of Analyst who are upgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions; WILCOXON T-STAT is the student t statistic 
measuring the difference of the percentage of Analyst who are upgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions from the percentage of Analyst who are 
downgrading there Earnings Forecast Revisions; WILCOXON P-VAL is the corresponding P-value for the WILCOXON T-STAT; 
 Average Median       WILCOXON 
Windows Examined # of observations Abnormal Abnormal T-STAT (P-VAL) Z-STAT (P-VAL) %NEG %POS T-STAT (P-VAL) 
 Return Return         
Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to 
the Synthetic Window 
 
38 1.946% 1.502 2.34 (0.025) 3.57 (0.000) 32.4 67.6 2.24 (0.013) 
Subsequent Repurchase Announcements 
Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
35 0.603% 0.664 0.86 (0.398) 1.47 (0.143) 48.4 51.6 1.21 (0.112) 
Repurchase Announcements During 
Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
108 1.233% 1.13 1.68 (0.096) 3.87 (0.000) 37.1 62.9 2.97 (0.001) 
Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to 
Synthetic Repurchase Window 
 
8 -1.496% -0.797 -0.71 (0.500) 0.01 (0.992) 62.5 37.5 0.42 (0.337) 
Windows Examined represents the for different event windows in which I assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine them; Initial 
Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window represents the first announcement of an “plain vanilla” open market repurchase program by firms 
that subsequently were involved in a synthetic program; Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all 
subsequent repurchase announcements that firms have made prior to the synthetic window. This is an aggregation of all “plain vanilla” open market repurchase 
announcements before the initiation of the synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. This are new announcements of either continuation and 
enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs from firms that have 
already done a repurchase; Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all new announcements of either continuation and 
enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs for the duration of 
synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives; Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window represents new 
announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely new open market 
repurchase programs after the termination of a synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. 
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Figure 6: A summary of the market model event study findings 
Abnormal
Market 5 Years average
Reaction
to Repurchase
Announcements
Pre-Synthetic Window Synthetic Window Post-Synthetic Window
2.0%
1.8%
1.6%
1.4%
1.2% Start End
1.0% o o o
0.8%
0.6% 8 events
0.4% o o o Time
0.2%
-0.2%
-0.4% 38 events 35 events 108 events
-0.6%
-0.8% 53 Firms 53 Firms total o o o
-1.0%
-1.2%
-1.4%
-1.6%
-1.8%
-2.0%
31 firms have an ongoing 
repurchase program
2 years average for the 22 
firms that terminated their 
synthetic repurchase
2 years average for the 22 
firms that terminated their 
synthetic repurchase
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2. Event Study of the Analyst Forecast Revisions 
Empirical results for the four different event windows that I am examining: For 
the event study of average analyst forecast revisions for the four different event windows 
that I am examining I report the following (summarized in Table 9 below).  
I find positive average analyst forecast revisions both for current and following 
year earnings at the initial repurchase announcement for all firms, which are going to sell 
put derivatives subsequently. The positive average analyst forecast revisions are 
marginally statistically significant for current year earnings and not statistically different 
from zero for the following year earnings. These findings are consistent with previous 
research. 
I find negative average analyst forecast revisions both for current and following 
year earnings at subsequent repurchase announcements before synthetic repurchase 
program initiation.  The negative average analyst forecast revisions are significant at the 
5% level for current year earnings and not statistically different from zero for the 
following year earnings. This have been explained in previous research with the fact that 
the main positive signal of the open market repurchase announcements have been 
transmitted to the market and the asymmetric information between the management of 
the firm and market participants have been significantly reduced. But now the firm 
management is confirming that they have run out of profitable investment opportunities, 
so the analyst would revise their earnings expectations downwards. 
I find significant positive average analyst forecast revisions both for current and 
following year earnings at the repurchase announcements during synthetic repurchase 
program. The positive average analyst forecast revisions for current year are statistically 
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significant at the 10% level and positive average analyst forecast revisions for following 
year are statistically significant at the 1% level. The initiation of the synthetic repurchase 
program is a positive signal from management that the market participants receive and I 
expected to be strong positive signal. Repurchase announcements during the duration of 
synthetic repurchase program are new announcements of either continuation and 
enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a 
completely new open market repurchase programs during the duration of synthetic 
repurchase program and I expect this announcement to be viewed from the market 
participants in a completely new way different from similar announcements before the 
transition of the signal, i.e. before the initiation of the synthetic repurchase program, i.e. 
before the upgrading from an open market stock repurchase program to synthetic 
repurchase program through put derivatives. 
I find not statistically different from zero average analyst forecast revisions both 
for current and following year earnings at the repurchase announcements after the 
termination of the synthetic repurchase program. I do not have enough observations in 
IBES to compute correct statistics for this event window. 
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Table 9: T-statistics and P-values for the average Analyst Forecast Revisions for months (0,2) 
Analyst Forecast Revisions Current Year represent the changes in analyst forecast predictions for the current year EPS (earnings per share); Analyst Forecast 
Revisions Following Year represent the changes in analyst forecast predictions for the following year EPS (earnings per share); Analyst Forecast Revisions for 
5 Year growth are all not significantly different from zero and are not reported in this table. 
 
Events Examined Analyst Forecast Revisions Current Year 
Analyst Forecast 
Revisions Following Year 
Initial Repurchase Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window 1.42 (0.164) 0.96 (0.343) 
Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window -2.12 (0.043)** -0.05 (0.960) 
Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic Repurchase Window 1.73 (0.088)* 4.55 (0.000)*** 
Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic Repurchase Window (Not 
enough events in IBES) 0.60 (0.658) 2.10 (0.283) 
 
*** The p-value is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
** The p-value is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
* The p-value is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
 
Windows Examined represents the for different event windows in which I assign the open market repurchase announcement to examine them; Initial Repurchase 
Announcement Prior to the Synthetic Window represents the first announcement of an “plain vanilla” open market repurchase program by firms that subsequently were 
involved in a synthetic program; Subsequent Repurchase Announcements Prior to the Synthetic Repurchase Window represents all subsequent repurchase announcements 
that firms have made prior to the synthetic window. This is an aggregation of all “plain vanilla” open market repurchase announcements before the initiation of the synthetic 
repurchase program through put derivatives. This are new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or 
announcements of a completely new open market repurchase programs from firms that have already done a repurchase; Repurchase Announcements During Synthetic 
Repurchase Window represents all new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely 
new open market repurchase programs for the duration of synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives; Repurchase Announcements Subsequent to Synthetic 
Repurchase Window represents new announcements of either continuation and enlargement of an ongoing open market repurchase program or announcements of a completely 
new open market repurchase programs after the termination of a synthetic repurchase program through put derivatives. 
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I have found empirical confirmation of the signaling hypothesis for the synthetic 
repurchases. My results empirically confirm my theoretical hypothesis that the initiation 
of the synthetic repurchase program offers a positive signal to the market. Also, my 
empirical results confirm my theoretical hypothesis that the termination of the synthetic 
repurchase program is a negative signal to the market. The market reacts positively to the 
initiation of a synthetic repurchase program and upon termination market reacts 
negatively. Results are similar with current and following year EPS analyst forecast 
revisions. 
C.  Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
I have CRSP data available until the end of the 1998 year. Accordingly, I estimate 
the one-year long-term stock performance of firms repurchasing their own shares for 38 
firms that started synthetic repurchase prior to 1998. 
I apply the buy-and-hold methodology developed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) using the CRSP database. I report 15% to 19% 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for the different sub samples for the four quarters following the start of the 
synthetic repurchase quarter. All the bootstrapped 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns are statistically significant at least at the 0.10 level. The t-statistics are statistically 
significant and adjusted for skewness and bootstrapped. 
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Table 10, Long-run abnormal stock price reaction: One year buy and hold Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai (1999) abnormal stock price reaction  
Mean BHAR12 is the bootstrapped 12-month Buy and Hold Abnormal Return. t-stat are skewness 
adjusted and bootstrapped t-statistics. p-value is the corresponding the two-tail p-value. 
Sample Portfolio
size
Mean
BHAR12
t-stat P-value
 Portfolio of firms with
Synthetic repurchase Program
Through Put Options 48 11.67% 1.92 3.045%
 Portfolio of rival firms with
same 4-digit SIC matched by size
(the 6 closest by market value) 303 9.60% 3.13 0.106%
 Portfolio of rival firms with
same 4-digit SIC and active
repurchase program matched by size
(the 3 closest by market value) 150 12.41% 2.64 0.458%
 Portfolio of rival firms with
same 4-digit SIC and no repurchase
program matched by size (the 3
closest by market value) 153 6.84% 2.23 1.360%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 4-digit SIC 2917 7.83% 4.06 0.003%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 4-digit SIC and active
repurchase program 443 12.69% 3.85 0.007%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 4-digit SIC and no
repurchase program 2474 6.96% 3.63 0.014%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 3-digit SIC 6088 7.53% 6.41 0.000%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 3-digit SIC and active
repurchase program 1120 12.83% 5.93 0.000%
 Portfolio of all rival firms
from the same industry, i.e. with
the same 3-digit SIC and no
repurchase program 4968 6.34% 5.30 0.000%
 
 
I am observing industry effect.  All firms from the same industry (industry to 
which firms the Investment Banks are offering to buy from Put Options in order to 
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enhance the selling firm share repurchase program) are outperforming the market, 
measured on risk adjusted basis by using Lion, Barber and Tsai (1999) book-to-market 
and size risk-adjusted portfolios to compute BHAR12 (Bay and Hold Abnormal Return 
for the 12 months fooling the start of Synthetic repurchase Program Through Put 
Options).  
The whole industry on a risk adjusted basis is outperforming the market by 8% 
independently of the way I construct the industry portfolio using all firms with the same 
3-digit SIC code, using all firms with the same 4-digit SIC or using only the three closest 
by market value firms from the same industry as measured by the 4-digit SIC. I also find 
that firms that have done or are going to do a repurchase program are outperforming the 
market by 12% for the following 12 months, independently of the fact if they are going to 
enhance their repurchase program with put options, while the firms that have never done 
a repurchase program are outperforming the market by only 7%. I can interpret the put 
selling as a management certification of the firm. I can generalize the certification to the 
whole industry and especially for the firms that have ongoing share repurchase program. 
My results should be more statistically and economically significant if I did not 
had a negative bias in my sample. There is dual separation of firms by the timing of the 
reporting of the put transaction. Some of the firms report right away and some report 
when they get in trouble. For the second type it is more likely to report the put transaction 
if the put is going into the money, and do not reported otherwise, so I have negative bias 
in my sample. As I can see from the correlation matrix and the regression below for each 
additional month that the firm is going to wait before reporting the put transaction I could 
expecting 5.3% negative BHAR12 (Bay and Hold Abnormal Return risk-adjusted using 
     
76 
Lion, Barber and Tsai (1999) size and book-to-market adjusted portfolios). Furthermore, 
the reporting of the put transaction is voluntarily. There is no SEC or FASB requirement 
to report it.   
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Table 11, Panel A: Gap in months between the Put Start and 10-Q or 10-K 
statement reporting the transaction 
Total Number of firms reported Gap in months
Number of
Months
6 within first month 0
12 in one months 1
22 within first quarter months 3
34 within second quarter months 6
40 within second quarter months 9
42 within 1 year 12
44 within 5 quarters 15
45 within 2 years 22
46 within 9 quarters 27
47 within 10 quarters 30
48 within 3 years 35
 
Table 11, Panel B: Correlation Matrix of BHAR12 and the gap between the Put 
Start and Filing of the 10-Q or 10-K statement announcing the transaction 
Correlation Intercept Gap in Months
Intercept 1 -0.62733
Gap in Months -0.62733 1
 
Table 11, Panel C: Regression of BHAR12 on the gap between the Put Start and 
Filing of the 10-Q or 10-K statement announcing the transaction21
Variable  DF  Std Error  t Ratio Approx P-value 
Intercept 1 20.228462 9.7475  2.075  0.0435 
Gap in
Months
47  -0.053874 0.0306  -1.760  0.0848 
                                                 
 
 
21 Additionally, 
SSE 132700.8 DFE 47
MSE 2823.422 Root MSE 53.13588
SBC 534.1372 AIC 530.3536
Reg Rsq 0.0619 Total Rsq 0.0619
Durbin-Watson 0.4162 
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I investigate new and unknown transactions. No press releases or Wall Street 
Journal announcements can be found for the start of the synthetic repurchase. Deals are 
revealed to the public much later than they are completed; usually transactions are private 
between the firm and its investment bank. For this reason, an event study could not be 
performed. In addition, at the time of publication the event cannot be separated from the 
other announcements included in that 10-Q or 10-K statement. But because I expect that 
there is a sequence of other events connected with the synthetic repurchase program I 
study long-run abnormal market performance that indicates 11.7% long-run buy-and-hold 
market over performance. 22 
I have collected evidence that synthetic repurchase enhances shareholder value, 
improving transactional efficiency and enriching information spread. The fact that 
synthetic repurchase increase shareholder value over time is evident from the 11.7% 
abnormal book-to-market and size-adjusted stock price overperformance. I have shown 
theoretically that synthetic repurchase could enhance transactional efficiency; that is, 
allow a firm basically to circumvent the 25% SEC trading limit.  
I have introduced a theoretical rationale that synthetic repurchase programs 
transmit a positive information signal. A put option brings positive cash inflow to good 
firms and is very expensive to imitate, because it would produce a large negative cash 
outflow for financially weak firms.  
In a sample of the 53 firms using synthetic repurchase I observe a statistically 
significant increase (0.05 level) in EBIT from year –5 to year 0 and from year 0 to year 5. 
                                                 
 
 
22 Kale, Jayant R. and Janet D. Payne, 1998, Timing of Seasoned Equity Issues and Financial Choices after 
the IPO, Georgia State University Working Paper. 
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There are similarly statistically significant increases in R&D expenditures from year –5 
to year 5 (0.05 level) and in the rates of change of R&D expenditures from year –5 to 5 
(0.10 level). I detect as well statistically significant increases in total assets and in market 
value from year –5 to 0 and from year 0 to 5 and in their rates of change from year -5 to 
year 5 (both after at the 0.05 level). All of these findings confirm the signaling 
hypothesis.  
I witness significant increase in cash and cash equivalents from year 0 to 5 at the 
0.05 level, which confirms the transactional efficiency hypothesis that synthetic 
repurchase allows trading while not constrained by the 25% SEC limit and allow firms to 
match future cash flows with the future obligation to repurchase stock. These findings, 
combined with the previous evidence of positive analyst forecast revisions for the sample 
of the 53 firms and a 11.7% statistically significant long-run buy-and-hold market over 
performance support the signaling hypothesis. 
Comparison of matched portfolios of firms with ongoing stock repurchase 
programs and no repurchase programs indicates that the synthetic repurchase firms 
increase their R&D expenditures at statistically significant rates for years –2 to 0, which 
confirms the availability of new projects in the firm. Besides knowledge of R&D project 
stage, managers have access to two more pieces of inside information. First, they know 
that they will have more cash, as evident by the statistically significant increase in that 
variable for years 1 to 5. Second, is the statistically significant increase in total assets, 
adjusted market value for years 1 to 5. Therefore, from managers’ point of view, the 
selling of put options is equivalent to collecting the put premiums tax-free; i.e., this is 
another good project. This sort of evidence confirms the growth option hypothesis. 
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Selling puts and buying calls enables the firms to accomplish two things. The 
strategy allows management to plan its cash outflows related to the stock repurchase 
programs and to trade without coming up against the 25% SEC limit. Financial analysts, 
who do not have access to the private firm information, will underestimate the firm’s 
positive net present value projects and earnings, and thus underestimate the future share 
price of the firm. As a result, higher premiums will be executed for the put sold by the 
firm and lower premiums for the call bought from the firm.  
Assuming that the risk of the firm has not changed, the only possible explanation 
left is that managers use synthetic repurchase to signal that the quality of the firm is 
higher than that of the other firms from the same industry that have repurchase programs. 
I interpret this as support of the signaling hypothesis. 
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VI. Conclusions 
Synthetic repurchase is an open market share repurchase program accompanied 
by a sale of put derivatives on the firm’s own stock. Financial practitioners have shown a 
significant interest in synthetic repurchase programs. Kale, Noe and Gay (1989) 
performed a case-study of Gillette’s anti-takeover defense and demonstrated the 
advantages of the use of puts on a firm’s own stock in connection with a repurchase 
program. The principal new feature of the synthetic repurchase as a signaling technique is 
that it transmits the signal without wasteful spending activity like the dividend increases, 
discussed by John and Williams (1985), or the inefficient investments and the passing up 
of positive NPV projects, discussed by Krasker (1986). 
I show theoretically that a good firm can use the inverse relation between the put 
payoff and the underlying firm stock very efficiently to signal and certify its quality. 
I observe that the firms with synthetic repurchase programs have higher earnings, 
R&D expenditures and cash flows as compared with two industry-and-size-matched 
control samples of rival firms with and without repurchase programs respectively. Risky 
R&D expenditures force firms to signal to the market information about good future 
EBIT figures via a synthetic repurchase program. 
I perform a longitudinal event study and find empirical confirmation of the 
signaling hypothesis for synthetic repurchase programs. My results empirically confirm 
my theoretical hypothesis that the initiation of a synthetic repurchase program offers a 
positive signal to the market. Also, my empirical results confirm my theoretical 
hypothesis that the termination of a synthetic repurchase program is a negative signal to 
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the market. The market reacts positively to the initiation of a synthetic repurchase 
program, and negatively to its termination. 
I also perform an EPS analyst forecast revisions event study with very similar 
results that also confirm the signalling hypothesis of asymmetric information. 
To evaluate the medium term stock performance of firms involved in a synthetic 
program, I apply the buy-and-hold methodology developed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
(1999) using the CRSP database. I report 11.7% twelve-months buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for the different sub-samples for the four quarters following the start of the put 
selling quarter. All the bootstrapped twelve-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. The adjusted for skewness and 
bootstrapped t-statistics are statistically significant. The observed overperformance 
confirms that the firms are trying to signal their good future prospects. 
My conclusions confirm the signaling hypothesis and agree with managements’ 
claims from the firms’ 10-K, 10-Q and proxy statements that synthetic repurchase 
programs through put derivatives enhance the ongoing open market share repurchase 
programs. 
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